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Abstract 
Once Wagner’s most popular opera, Lohengrin has suffered scholarly neglect in the postwar 
period. This essay reengages with the work from the novel perspective of game theory 
analysis. Centering on Elsa’s breach of the Frageverbot, it offers a rigorous epistemological 
study of the opera’s main characters. Against traditional interpretations of the heroine’s fatal 
decision, we propose a complex and psychologically more satisfactory account. Elsa asks the 
forbidden question because she needs to confirm Lohengrin’s belief in her innocence, a belief 
that Ortrud successfully eroded in Act II. This novel interpretation reveals Elsa as a rational 
individual, upgrades the dramatic significance of the Act I combat scene, and signals a 
hermeneutic return to the heart of opera criticism, the drama itself. 
 
 
For an opera titled after its male hero, Lohengrin surprisingly revolves around a tragic 
spouse. Elsa enters the stage wrongfully accused of a crime, spends half of her presence in 
Acts II and III torn by doubt, suffers public humiliation on her way to the altar, breaks her 
marital vow, and practically brings down the curtain with her onstage collapse. Wagner’s 
engrossing vision of the ‘absolute artist’ is brilliantly realized through the contrast between a 
knight so perfect that he is condemned to the passivity of a respondent (even his Frageverbot 
is dictated from above), and a dreamy maid burdened with the opera’s two vital decisions:   2
invoking the knight to defend her innocence, and later breaking her ignorance pledge of his 
origins. Indeed, on Elsa’s promise to keep clear of the forbidden question Wagner hinges the 
two sources of suspense fueling the drama: the uncertainty about her guilt (Act I) and the 
growing speculation about Lohengrin’s ‘Nam und Art’ (Acts II, III). 
  Conviction and doubt lie at the heart of Wagner’s Lohengrin (‘Lohengrin suchte das 
Weib, das an ihn glaubte’ [Lohengrin sought the woman who believed in him]
1) and 
naturally call for an epistemological analysis of its characters’ beliefs. What is certain and 
what remains conjectural? How much does each character know about the others? What do 
they know about what the others know about themselves? And in what way does each arrive 
at conclusions and translate them into actions? Such questions already have been asked by 
literary critics and game theorists exploring drama and fiction.
2 Steve Roth’s analysis of the 
‘Mousetrap’ in Hamlet – where the noun ‘belief’ appears twice as frequently as in any other 
of Shakespeare’s play – shows that, against common perception, Hamlet does not actually 
gain knowledge of his father’s murder. His proceeding to exact revenge ‘despite of knowing 
                                                 
1 Richard Wagner, Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen (Leipzig, 1911-1914), IV:295-6, rpt. 
in John Deathridge and Klaus Döge, eds., Richard Wagner. Sämtliche Werke. Band 26: 
Dokumente und Texte zu Lohengrin (Mainz, 2003), 21. All German excerpts from the libretto 
are taken from this source. 
2 For a survey of cognitive literary criticism, see Allan Richardson, ‘Studies in Literature and 
Cognition: A Field Map’, in Alan Richardson and Ellen Spolsky, eds., Cognition, Culture, 
and Complexity (Aldershot and Burlington, 2004), 1-29. Steven J. Brams offers a historical 
survey of game theory applications to literature in ‘Game Theory and Literature’, Games and 
Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 32-54.   3
that he can never truly know’ renders Hamlet the first modern tragedy.
3 In his path-breaking 
monograph I Know that You Know that I Know, George Butte studies belief systems in 
(among others) Jane Austen’s novels, pointing to the ‘deep intersubjectivity’ in beliefs about 
beliefs (commonly referred to as higher or second-order beliefs).
4 Lisa Zunshine explores 
Richardson’s Clarissa and Nabokov’s Lolita from the perspectives of theory of mind or 
metarepresentation (thinking about other people’s thoughts and distinguishing informational 
layers in fiction).
5 More recently, economists have applied game theory to study drama and 
opera. Analysing episodes of the TV series CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, Benedikt Löwe, 
Eric Pacuit, and Sanchit Saraf propose a formal algorithm to track the characters’ belief 
systems and uncover building blocks of fictional narratives.
6 Closer to music, Heike 
Harmgart, Steffen Huck, and Wieland Müller use counterfactual analysis to explain 
Tannhäuser’s disruptive behavior at the singing contest in Wagner’s eponymous opera, 
identifying the hero’s dilemma once the contest is underway.
7 
                                                 
3 Steve Roth, ‘Who knows who knows who’s there? An epistemology of Hamlet (Or, what 
happens in the mousetrap)’, Early Modern Literary Studies, 10/2 (2004), 1-27. 
4 George Butte, I Know That You Know That I Know: Narrating Subjects from Moll Flanders 
to Marnie (Columbus, 2004). 
5 Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus, 2006); 
and her ‘Why Jane Austen Was Different, And Why We May Need Cognitive Science to See 
It’, Style, 41 (2007), 273-97. 
6 ‘Identifying the structure of a narrative via an agent-based logic of preferences and beliefs: 
Formalizations of episodes from CSI: Crime Scene Investigation’, Institute for Logic, 
Language, & Computation, University of Amsterdam, Prepublication Series PP-2009-33. 
7 ‘Tannhäuser’s Dilemma: A Counterfactual Analysis’, ELSE working papers #315. See also 
their paper ‘The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner’s   4
  In an age where reality and fiction tend to mix freely, cognitive literary criticism 
promises to enrich opera hermeneutics by interrogating character behavior.
8 Game theory 
especially allows us to probe the state of knowledge and set of strategies for each character in 
a closed system of human interaction, thus leading to a deeper understanding of human 
conflict, the root of all drama.
9 Although not any opera is amenable to this type of analysis, 
those of Wagner demonstrate the highest integration of music and drama.
10 Lohengrin, in 
particular, offers a test case, as its waning postwar popularity rests considerably on 
dissatisfaction with its dramatic properties.
11 The knight’s affirmation of love-at-first-sight 
                                                                                                                                                        
romantic opera Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg’, Economic Letters, 102 
(2009), 33-5. 
8 Evaluating game theory in 1960, mathematician/psychologist Anatol Rapoport found that it 
‘stimulates us to think about conflict in a new way’ and, at the very least, it has an impact on 
our thinking processes: Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor, 1960), 242. 
9 For a general introduction to rational choice theory and games, see Ken Binmore, Rational 
Decisions (Princeton, 2009). Specific applications of strategic thinking in real life appear in 
Avinash K. Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in 
Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (New York, 1991), and its revised form as The Art of 
Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business & Life (New York and London, 
2008). 
10 Unlike popular fiction, high drama explores the high order beliefs of characters. Löwe, 
Pacuit, and Saraf find that almost all the plots of CSI are entirely built around problems of 
first-order beliefs (who did what). 
11 For the opera’s contradictory elements, see Carl Dahlhaus, Richard Wagner’s Music 
Dramas, trans. Mary Whittall (Cambridge, 1979), 35-48. The allegation that Hitler’s title 
‘Führer’ was inspired by the opera’s finale and the lavishly produced revival of Lohengrin by   5
for Elsa (Act III scene 2) is contradicted by the mercenary quid pro quo of their marriage, and 
his declining the title of Duke (Act II scene 3) casts doubts on his long-term commitment to 
Brabant. Moreover, Elsa’s martyrdom is hardly tolerable in a period of female assertiveness 
and the knight’s tender feelings for his ‘lieber Schwan!’ (Act I scene 3), which Wagner 
exposes with an orchestral Generalpause, yield knowing smiles among gay and straight 
listeners alike. Above all, the opera’s bleak ending, with both heroes departing and leaving 
the stage to first-timer Gottfried is hardly attractive to audiences exposed to spectacular or 
comforting finales in other dramatic genres. If anything, Wagner’s creative struggle with this 
finale shows a conscious thinking about his characters.
12 
 
Elsa’s (rational) choice 
Since Elsa makes the dramatic vortex of the opera, this essay concentrates on her beliefs and 
behavior. Wagner literature presents a rather simplistic view of her asking the forbidden 
question. Critics have blamed either Lohengrin’s cruelty and the impossibility of his 
demand,
13 or Elsa’s emotional instability.
14 Absence of knowledge of his identity leads her to 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Nazis in 1936 certainly did not help: Pamela M. Potter, ‘Wagner and the Third Reich: 
myths and realities’, in Thomas S. Grey, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Wagner 
(Cambridge, 2008), 242. 
12 See John Deathridge, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Some Remarks on the First Complete 
Draft of Lohengrin’, Carolyn Abbate and Roger Parker, eds., Analyzing Opera: Verdi and 
Wagner (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1989), 81-91. 
13 Wagner’s exploration of the theme of divine-human intersection begins with his first opera 
Die Feen (1834): Thomas S. Grey, ‘Meister Richard’s apprenticeship: the early operas (1833-
1840)’, in Grey, Cambridge Companion to Wagner, 24. According to Stewart Spencer,   6
fears of either being abandoned or unable to help him in need. Against these predictable 
explanations the game theory analysis presented here offers a psychologically deeper and 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Lohengrin is the artist ... who descends to earth in search of self-fulfillment, only to find 
disillusionment and annihilation’: ‘The ‘Romantic operas’ and the turn to myth’, in Grey, 
Cambridge Companion to Wagner, 71. 
14 For Carl Dahlhaus ‘The condition Lohengrin lays down is impossible of fulfilment; Elsa 
would have to ask him his name, even without Ortrud’s interference’: Dahlhaus, Richard 
Wagner’s Music Dramas, 39. Similarly, Kurt Pahlen calls Lohengrin’s demand ‘inhumane’ 
and ‘bordering on the impossible’ and finds Elsa’s breach ‘typically female’: Richard 
Wagner: Lohengrin: Einführung und Kommentar (Mainz, 1982), 261. Other writers 
emphasize Elsa’s fear of loss. In Ernest Newman’s account, she fears that ‘as by magic he 
had come to her, so by magic he may be taken from her’: The Wagner Operas (Princeton, 
1949), 159. Dieter Borchmeyer argues that her dread of the numinous ‘inspires in Elsa an 
insane and self-destructive desire to know her husband’s true identity’: Drama and the World 
of Richard Wagner (Princeton, 2004), 150. Issues of certainty and identity have also been 
raised. Nike Wagner, for example, claims Elsa ‘must ask the question’ since love requires 
‘sensual certainty’ and is not ‘an abstract emotion’: Wagner Theater (Frankfurt, 1998), 87; 
and Barry Emslie argues that Lohengrin’s conditions ‘cannot be reconciled with the mundane 
nature of marriage’ and that Elsa, by asking the question, ‘asserts the importance of the 
sexual couple as a collective identity over that of the single male hero’: ‘The domestication of 
opera’, Cambridge Opera Journal, 5 (1993), 171. In an alternative reading, finally, Slavoj 
Zizek proposes that Elsa ‘intentionally asks the fateful question and thereby delivers 
Lohengrin whose true desire, of course, is to remain the lone artist sublimating his suffering 
into his creativity’: ‘“There is no Sexual Relationship”: Wagner as a Lacanian’, New German 
Critique, 69 (1996), 30.   7
dramatically more powerful one, which also upgrades the significance of the Act I combat 
scene. Elsa asks because her ignorance of her husband’s identity raises doubts about his belief 
in her innocence. This second-order belief (Elsa thinking about her spouse’s thinking about 
her) reveals that she has a theory of mind, showing that there is ample sophistication in her 
emotional turbulence. 
This novel perspective draws support from Wagner himself, whose prose draft of the 
libretto has Elsa explicitly conditioning Lohengrin’s belief in her innocence upon her own 
belief in his mission: ‘So wie du an meine Unschuld glaubst, glaub’ ich an deine hohe 
Sendung!’
15 At the time, just after Lohengrin’s arrival and before the trial-by-combat that 
will determine her fate, Elsa had no reason to doubt his identity: the knight had duly 
responded to her call and was willing to risk his life for her innocence. She had faith and was 
certain. A master psychologist, whose cognitive sophistication Wagner heightens with a 
progressive musical idiom,
16 Ortrud understands that without breaking the two interlocked 
beliefs she will never get rid of Elsa and her omnipotent knight. Indeed, her first attempt to 
shake Elsa’s faith, by invoking the fear of loss and abandonment, fails resoundingly: 
ORTRUD 
Wohl daß ich dich warne, 
zu blind nicht deinem Glück zu trau’n; 
daß nicht ein Unheil dich umgarne, 
                                                 
15 Dokumente und Texte zu Lohengrin, 213. For a survey of Wagner’s changes from the prose 
draft to the final libretto, see Ernest Newman, Wagner Nights (London, 1949), 117-25. 
16 See Graham G. Hunt, ‘Ortrud and the Birth of a New Style in Act 2, Scene 1 of Wagner’s 
Lohengrin’, The Opera Quarterly, 20 (2004), 47-70. Her superior understanding of 
psychology presumably generates from her pagan beliefs. Tales of multiple gods are 
psychologically more sophisticated than the deliberations of a single all-powerful god.   8




Könntest du erfassen, 
wie dessen Art so wundersam, 
der nie dich möge so verlassen, 
wie er durch Zauber zu dir kam! 
ELSA 
Du Ärmste kannst wohl nie ermessen, 
wie zweifellos mein Herze liebt! 
Du hast wohl nie das Glück besessen, 
das sich uns nur durch Glauben gibt! 
Kehr’ bei mir ein, laß mich dich lehren 
wie süß die Wonne reinster Treu’! 
Laß zu dem Glauben dich bekehren: 




It were well I should warn you 
not to trust too blindly in your happiness; 
lest some misfortune should befall you, 
let me look into the future for you. 




Have you never reflected 
that he of such mysterious lineage 
might leave you in the same way 
as by magic he came to you? 
ELSA 
Poor woman, you can never measure 
how free of doubt is my heart! 
You have indeed never known the happiness 
that only faith can give. 
Come in with me! Let me teach you 
how sweet is the bliss of perfect trust! 
Let yourself be converted to faith: 
it brings happiness without alloy!] 
Elsa resists the attack because her faith in the knight is grounded in their pact. He proved his 
belief in her innocence by winning the combat, and so she believes in his high mission and 
their happiness. In the following soliloquy, Ortrud swiftly updates her strategy. Her failure to 
instill doubt in Elsa’s mind becomes a lever for a renewed and more powerful assault, as it 
inflated Elsa’s confidence. Which dreamy maid could possibly teach happiness and ‘perfect 
trust’ to an older and experienced woman? 
ORTRUD 
Ha! Dieser Stolz, er soll mich lehren, 
wie ich bekämpfe ihre Treu’:   10
gen ihn will ich die Waffen kehren, 




Ha! This pride of hers shall teach me 
how to undermine her trust! 
Against it I will turn her own weapon: 
through her pride shall come her pain!] 
To know something is one thing; to be able to teach it is to know that you know it. Until now 
Elsa was faithful and certain; from the moment she rejects Ortrud’s ludicrous suggestion she 
also knows that she is faithful. What she cannot realize is that her inflated self-assurance 
makes her more vulnerable to another attack. Indeed, Ortrud’s assault in Act II scene 4 is 
unexpected and shattering, as it combines private betrayal (Elsa: ‘I was misled by your 
deceit’), a breach of social protocol (the wife of an exiled man challenges in public space 
Brabant’s heiress) and public accusation that, if true, exposes a state conspiracy (Brabant 
cannot be ruled by an impostor knight and a murderess Elsa). 
ORTRUD 
Weil eine Stund’ ich meines Werth’s vergessen, 
glaub’st du, ich müßte dir nur kriechend nah’n? 
Mein Leid zu rächen will ich mich vermessen, 
was mir gebührt, das will ich nun empfah’n. 
ELSA 
Weh’! Ließ ich durch dein Heucheln mich verleiten, 
die diese Nacht sich jammernd zu mir stahl?   11
Wie willst du nun in Hochmuth vor mir schreiten, 
du, eines Gottgerichteten Gemahl? 
ORTRUD 
Wenn falsch Gericht mir den Gemahl verbannte, 
war doch sein Nam’ im Lande hochgeehrt; 
als aller Tugend Preis man ihn nur nannte, 
gekannt, gefürchtet war sein tapf’res Schwert. 
Der deine, sag’, wer sollte hier ihn kennen, 
vermagst du selbst den Namen nicht zu nennen? 
[...] 
Kannst du ihn nennen? Kannst du uns es sagen, 
ob sein Geschlecht, sein Adel wohl bewährt? 
Woher die Fluthen ihn zu dir getragen, 
wann und wohin er wieder von dir fährt? 
Ha, nein! Wohl brächte ihm es schlimme Noth; 
der kluge Held die Frage drum verbot! 
[...] 
ELSA 
Du Lästerin! Ruchlose Frau! 
Hör’, ob ich Antwort mir getrau’! 
So rein und edel ist sein Wesen, 
so tugendreich der hehre Mann, 
daß nie des Unheil’s soll genesen, 
wer seiner Sendung zweifeln kann! 
Hat nicht durch Gott im Kampf geschlagen   12
mein theurer Held den Gatten dein? 
Nun sollt nach Recht ihr alle sagen, 
wer kann da nur der Reine sein? 
[...] 
ORTRUD 
Ha! Diese Reine deines Helden, 
wie wäre sie so bald getrübt, 
müßt’ er des Zaubers Wesen melden, 
durch den hier solche Macht er übt! 
Wagst du ihn nicht darum zu fragen, 
so glauben alle wir mit Recht, 
du müßtest selbst in Sorge zagen, 




Because for an hour I forgot my position 
do you think that I must only cringe before you? 
I intend to have revenge for my suffering; 
I demand what is mine by right! 
ELSA 
Ah! I was misled by your deceit 
when last night you crept lamenting to me. 
How can you now arrogantly walk before me, 
the wife of one condemned by God?   13
ORTRUD 
Although false judgment has condemned my husband, 
his name was highly honoured in the land; 
he was called the crown of all virtue, 
his valiant sword was known and feared. 
But yours, who here can know him 
if you yourself may not call him by his name? 
[...] 
Can you name him? Can you tell us 
whether his lineage, his nobility, is well attested, 
from whence the waters brought him to you, 
when he will leave you again, and for where? 
Ah no! It would bring disaster on him – 
so the crafty hero forbade the question! 
[...] 
ELSA 
Slanderer! Wicked woman! 
Hear, if I can trust myself to answer! 
So pure and noble is his nature, 
so virtuous this exalted being, 
that none who can doubt his mission 
shall ever be free from ill-fortune. 
Did not my dear hero, with God’s help, 
strike down your husband in the combat? 
Now let all say, in justice,   14
which alone can be innocent? 
[...] 
ORTRUD 
Ha, how soon would this innocence 
of your hero be besmirched 
if he had to reveal the magic craft 
by which he wields such power here! 
If you do not dare to question him 
we shall all believe, with right 
that you yourself falter in misgiving, 
and have little confidence in his innocence!] 
Launched as an unprovoked attack against Lohengrin’s honesty, Ortrud’s disruption (before 
the house of God, of all places) has cognitive effects. By introducing an alternative 
explanation for his victory she forces Elsa – indeed, everyone present – to confront two 
scenarios: either her savior won by valor, thus proving her innocence, or he cheated through 
magical means (‘Zaubers Wesen’), which makes possible that, after all, he did not believe in 
her innocence. In the following scenes, Elsa gradually realizes that without revealing his 
identity she cannot verify his ‘hohe Sendung’ upon which her belief in his belief in her 
innocence really depends.
17 What underlies her turbulence in the Act III duet is this concern 
                                                 
17 Richard Jones’ Lohengrin at the Bavarian State Opera (2009) seems to adopt a similar 
reading. The knight is shown to be using magic in the combat (and also in his final 
confrontation with Friedrich). Visibly shaken by this, Elsa rushes to a room where she has 
kept a ‘missing person’ poster of her brother. Through Elsa’s staring at it, Jones illustrates the 
nexus between Lohengrin’s ‘Nam und Art’ and the question of her own guilt in the case of 
the missing brother.   15
for her innocence in the mind of her spouse. What once was a simple mindset of unshakeable 
faith in God and her savior has turned, with Ortrud’s cognitive manipulation, into a world of 
multiple and conflicting possibilities and uncertainties. The price of saving her marriage (not 
asking the forbidden question) is to live knowing of Ortrud’s alternative explanation without 
ever being able to test it. The price of restoring her Act I certainty (asking the question) is to 
risk her marriage (note, however, that the knight never specified the consequences of her vow 
breach, which leaves open the possibility that she might be forgiven). We can represent her 
dilemma as follows: 
Elsa’s strategy 
  secure knowledge of 
Lohengrin’s identity
protect my marriage /  
be happy with Lohengrin
Don’t ask the forbidden question
 
NO YES/  NOT  QUITE 




By choosing the second, Elsa proves that she is both human and a thinker; and that her mental 
stability (the need to know) outweighs her emotional pain (the fear to lose). If she is 
devastated in the finale, at least she does know her departing husband’s identity, which 
confirms to all Brabant and to herself that he won the combat fairly, thus proving her 
innocence. Her objective being fulfilled, she, too, is free to depart the world, though in the 
way humans do (collapsing entseelt). 
   16
Bayesian updating and the trial-by-combat 
Elsa’s martyrdom is first and foremost mental, we propose. Quite suddenly, she passes from a 
cognitive state of absolute knowledge to that of stochastic belief, predicating on alternatives 
that inform her decision-making. To understand her condition, let us ponder on the ultimate 
consequences of Ortrud’s scenario: if the knight cheated, then Friedrich was presumably the 
real winner. If so, his charges against Elsa were just and she was guilty, which is, of course, 
impossible for her to accept, for she knows of her innocence. The only solution for this 
impasse would be to consider trial-by-combat as being inherently flawed, which then would 
cast doubt on the existence of divine justice and, ultimately, of God. In short, Elsa’s entire 
worldview would collapse. The judicial duel concluding Act 1 thus turns into a focal point in 
the minds of everyone except Lohengrin, and deserves to be examined as something more 
than a piece of spectacular action or a formal counterweight to the wedding procession in Act 
III. 
In medieval times, trial-by-combat or judicial duel was reserved for cases where the 
truth of a matter could not be ascertained otherwise, such as murders without witnesses. It 
was accepted that, because of the high stakes involved (losing one’s own life), one was 
submitting his case directly to God’s hands to receive either victory or death regardless of his 
physical attributes.
18 As this ‘wager of battel’ involves a winning and a losing agent, it 
qualifies as a zero-sum bet and can be further illuminated through a class of celebrated results 
in game theory called agreement theorems. The basic logic of these theorems is grounded in 
the observation that, if somebody is willing to bet against us, he must have different 
                                                 
18 For a historical background of this judicial procedure, see Vickie L. Ziegler, Trial by Fire 
and Battle in Medieval German Literature (Rochester, 2004), 7-10.   17
information from ours. And this we need to take into account when we update our beliefs.
19 
As a result, agents will never trade in a zero-sum environment where one’s gain is the other’s 
loss, and they will never bet.
20 Agreement theorems and the Bayesian updating they rest on 
allow us to probe the degree of knowledge and strategies of both combatants even before they 
cross swords. 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Robert J. Aumann, ‘Agreeing to disagree’, The Annals of Statistics, 4/6 
(1976), 1236-39; Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey, ‘Information, Trade and Common 
Knowledge’, Journal of Economic Theory, 26 (1982), 17-27; James K. Sebenius and John 
Geanakoplos, ‘Don’t Bet On It: Contingent Agreements With Asymmetric Information’, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 78 (1983), 424-26. 
20 An example from the world of finance: Consider a seller who has an asset of uncertain 
value and a potential buyer. Both have some private information about what the asset’s value 
upon eventual liquidation. The information they have may differ such that, initially, the 
values they attach to the asset may differ. If the buyer has more positive information than the 
seller he may be more optimistic about the asset’s future value than the seller and, thus, from 
the outset one might think that they have incentives to trade. But now notice that the sheer 
willingness of the potential buyer to buy the asset at a price above the seller’s reservation 
value contains information for the seller. Why would the buyer be willing to buy at such a 
price if he had not more optimistic information than the seller? Hence, the seller must update 
his beliefs about the expected value of the asset. At the same time, when the seller’s sheer 
willingness to sell at a low price contains information for the buyer who must infer that the 
seller has some more pessimistic information. Hence, he has to adjust his beliefs downward. 
As can be shown mathematically, this process of belief adjustment will continue until both, 
seller and buyer, reach agreement about the expected value of the seller and, hence, lose their 
interest to trade.   18
Thomas Bayes (1702 – 1761) was a British mathematician and Presbyterian minister 
who showed, in a posthumously published Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine 
of Chances (1763), how conditional probabilities can be computed.
21 If a piece of news 
arrives, the probability of something being the case has to be recomputed conditional on the 
new information. This very process where a prior belief is transformed into a conditional or 
posterior belief is the process of Bayesian updating. Common examples include investors 
updating their beliefs about the economic potential of companies in response to the arrival of 
new technologies; voters adjusting their beliefs about a politician’s integrity after hearing 
rumours about corruption; and lovers pondering how much they are loved back despite a 
phone that does not ring. New information can arrive as factual knowledge (e.g. updating 
weather forecast on the basis of new data) or in the form of other people’s beliefs. The latter 
is the one we will apply to the two combatants in Lohengrin. 
As mentioned above, the trial by combat is a zero-sum game: Lohengrin bets on 
Elsa’s innocence and Friedrich on Elsa’s guilt. Since only one is expected to survive, both 
contestants have to be fairly certain about their respective cause. This can happen only if they 
have uneven access to private information. Indeed, Lohengrin knows for a fact that Elsa did 
not kill her brother because, omniscience discounted, he was led to Brabant by the supposed 
murder victim transformed into a swan. Friedrich, on the other side, believes in her guilt 
based on second-hand evidence, Ortrud’s eyewitness account and his observing Elsa’s 
behavior during interrogation: 
als ich mit Drohen nun in Elsa drang, 
da ließ in bleichem Zagen und Erbeben 
                                                 
21 Andrew I. Dale, Most Honourable Remembrance: The Life and Works of Thomas Bayes 
(New York, 2003), 258-335; see also Stephen M. Stigler, ‘Thomas Bayes’s Bayesian 
Inference’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General), 145 (1982), 250-58.   19
der gräßlichen Schuld Bekenntniß sie uns seh’n. [ll. 50-52] 
 
[when I questioned Elsa threateningly 
her pallor and her trembling revealed to us 
her confession of her hideous crime.] 
His indirect knowledge is compounded by conflict of interest: the eyewitness happens to be 
Elsa’s enemy and, by the time of the trial, also his wife; still worse, both benefit from Elsa’s 
death. This is one reason why he avoids disclosing his source before the King and rushes to 
propose a duel: 
Wess’ ich sie zeih’, dess’ hab’ ich sich’ren Grund: 
glaubwürdig ward ihr Frevel mir bezeugt. 
Doch eurem Zweifel durch ein Zeugniß wehren, 
das stünde wahrlich übel mein Stolz! [ll. 131-134] 
 
[Her offence is proved to me beyond doubt; 
but to dispel your doubts by calling a witness 
would truly wound my pride!] 
In the absence of contradictory evidence and without Lohengrin’s presence, Friedrich has 
every reason to expect victory. Indeed, no Brabantine volunteers to defend Elsa (‘Ohn’ 
Antwort ist der Ruf verhallt:’ l. 172 [The challenge dies away unanswered]), prompting 
Friedrich to boast ‘auf meiner Seite bleibt das Recht.’ (l. 175) [Right is on my side!]. 
The knight’s arrival changes everything. He is a stranger, thus he cannot be evaluated, 
lands (or rather docks) in a miraculous way and looks pure beyond doubt: 
welch’ seltsam Wunder! ...  
...   20
Ein Wunder ist gekommen! 
Ha, unerhörtes, nie geseh’nes Wunder! [ll. 187-194] 
 
[What a strange and wondrous sight! ... 
... 
A miracle has transpired, 
A miracle such as we have not heard nor seen!] 
Indeed, the Brabantines advise Friedrich ‘Steh’ ab vom Kampf! Wenn du ihn wagst, / zu 
siegen nummer du vermagst!’ (ll. 256-257) [Call off the fight! If you challenge him, / you 
will never succeed in conquering him.] Under Bayesian updating, he should reconsider his 
commitment to the duel because of Lohengrin’s willingness to fight and everybody’s updated 
belief that he may not win. Wagner himself describes his deportment as one of inner struggle 
(‘mit leidenschaftlich schwankendem und endlich sich entscheidendem, innerem Kampfe’: ll. 
261/262; in the verse draft, ‘nach heftigem inneren Kampfe’: l. 433). Why does he, then, 
continue the challenge and agree to fight? 
 
Friedrich’s beliefs 
We propose that Friedrich’s beliefs change in a subtle way, thus affecting the logic of 
agreement theorems. His belief ‘Elsa is guilty’, based on Ortrud’s account, is displaced by a 
belief in his sincerity in believing ‘Elsa is guilty’. Observe that from now on his statements 
revolve exclusively around his honor and truthfulness (‘ich zu lügen nie vermeint.’: l. 266 [I 
have never stooped to tell a lie]). The duel is no longer about Elsa’s crime but about his 
integrity in espousing this belief (‘Herr Gott, verlass’ mein’ Ehre nicht!’: l. 299 [Lord God, 
let me not be dishonoured!]). Moments before crossing swords with Lohengrin, Friedrich still 
has something to gain even if he dies: his personal integrity.   21
Friedrich’s strategy 
  prove Elsa’s guilt defend my sincerity 
Fight with Lohengrin 
 
MAYBE YES 




Agreement theorems predict that agents will only bet and knights will only fight if they have 
either perfect knowledge (such as Lohengrin) or if the zero-sum assumption does not quite 
hold, that is, if one agent stands to gain something from engaging in the bet regardless of its 
outcome (such as Friedrich who wants to maintain his sincerity). Friedrich is bound to lose 
not only because Lohengrin (his divine nature aside) fights for the right cause, but also 
because he himself replaced the strength of a first-order belief with a reflection upon it.
 22 In 
warfare higher-order beliefs are crucial for winning a battle, but can be fatal for those in the 
line of fire, who are supposed to act instantly without any reflection.
23 Friedrich’s ‘updating’ 
has consequences for his post-duel attitude, as we shall see below. 
  His life being spared by the knight, Friedrich is left to bemoan the loss of his honor 
(‘Mein’ Ehr’ hab’ ich verloren, / mein’ Ehr’, mein’ Ehr’ ist hin!’: ll. 362-363). Still believing 
in God’s will (‘Weh’! mich hat Gott geschlagen,’: l. 320), his defeat proves he was wrong 
and his witness, Ortrud, had lied to him: 
                                                 
22 On this subject, see Dan Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, Mind & Language, 
12/1 (March 1997), 67-83. 
23 ‘Many armies got their soldiers drunk before battle. This may have reduced their fighting 
efficiency, but it also reduced their capacity for rational calculation of self-preservation’: 
Dixit and Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy, 423.   22
War’s nicht dein Zeugniß, deine Kunde, 
die mich bestrickt, die Reine zu verklagen? 
... 
Und machtest mich, ...  
zu deiner Lüge schändlichem Genossen?’ (ll. 368-369, 383-385) 
 
Was it not your testimony, your story, 
that inveigled me into accusing the innocent Elsa? 
... 
And made me, ... 
the base accomplice of your lies? 
Although she knows of Elsa’s innocence, Ortrud does not believe in God, thus she is not 
obliged to accept the result as fair. At her lowest point in the opera, she finds recourse in her 
fertile mind and spins the alternative scenario that will drive Lohengrin off Brabant and will 
lead to Elsa’s and (accidentally?) to her own husband’s deaths: the knight cheated using 
magic, thus Elsa is guilty and should be condemned leaving Friedrich to rule Brabant and 
Ortrud to restore worship of her pagan gods. 
  The trial-by-combat and Lohengrin’s victory thus beget the mental conflict that will 
dominate the following two acts. The question is why Friedrich, who has been duped once by 
Ortrud with catastrophic results is willing to follow her for a second time. A ready 
explanation is that he has nothing to lose. His honor and lofty position in Brabant vanished, 
he finds Ortrud’s comforting scenario preferable to the harsh reality of poverty and exile. On 
a deeper, cognitive level, however, we find in Act II scene 1 that his belief in Elsa’s guilt was 
actually mounted on his own belief in Ortrud’s honesty and accuracy. 













Elsa is guilty 
trial-by-combat is a judicium Dei 
I lose 
Elsa is innocent 








Ortrud says she witnessed Elsa killing 
Gottfried 
Ortrud is a reliable witness 
I am an honest man who never lies 
trial-by-combat is a judicium Dei 
I lose 
Ortrud didn’t witness the 
crime 
Ortrud is dishonest 
I am honest (though gullible) 
the trial-by-combat was 
flawed  
 
Had Friedrich entered the duel with a first-order belief on Elsa, he would have had to accept 
its outcome as just. Instead, he confronted Lohengrin from a cognitively weak position 
(accepting a second-hand account and sliding into self-reflexivity), thus opening up his mind 
to multiple explanations. Of his pre-duel beliefs the one about his honesty cannot be revised 
because it is based on personal knowledge, thus making the truth of all the rest open to 
question. This mental crack allows Ortrud to plant the seed of doubt in Act II scene 1. 
 
Enter the Music 
If anything, the above interpretation upgrades the role of Ortrud, whom Wagner invented 
specifically as a reactionary figure (Reaktionärin).
24 Her addition to the Lohengrin story 
                                                 
24 Stewart Spencer and Barry Millington, eds., Selected Letters of Richard Wagner (New 
York, 1987), 248.   24
creates two couples, instead of a pair and a villain, thus increasing the opera’s dramatic 
complexity. Among other advantages, our cognitive perspective exposes a new coupling 
based on the characters’ state of beliefs.
25 Lohengrin and Ortrud hold absolute beliefs, always 
know more than their partners, control the flow of information to them (a forbidden question 
and an alternative scenario), and do survive (though having failed to reach their goals). It is 
no coincidence that Wagner associates them with two relative keys (A major and F-sharp 
minor). One even is tempted to find symbolic meaning in the tonic-submediant oscillation in 
the ‘Grail’ motif and its melodic equivalent in Loehngrin’s statements, as if the 6 scale degree 
introduces a human variable in the perfection of the A major triad (for instance, in his address 
to the swan). [Ex. 1]
26 Conscious of his harmonic operations, Wagner rewards Ortrud’s 
short-lived victory in the end of the opera with the Grail theme appearing on her key until 
Lohengrin’s prayer breaks her magic spell once and for all, and restores Brabant’s ‘Führer’ 
with a triumphant perfect cadence on A major. [Ex. 2] Elsa and Friedrich, on the other hand, 
have to adjust their beliefs throughout the opera, which leads to fluctuating behavior, and 
                                                 
25 Robert Wilson has explored the idea of complementary couples in his production of 
Lohengrin, where ‘Ortrud and Elsa have mirroring movements to suggest that they represent 
different aspects of one character’: Mike Ashman, ‘Wagner on stage: aesthetic, 
dramaturgical, and social considerations’, in Grey, Cambridge Companion to Wagner, 272. 
From our perspective, this gesture confirms Ortrud as a social chameleon with a wide 
behavioral range. She is capable of adopting her target’s mentality and subtly manipulating 
his/her mind. 
26 The musical examples are from the vocal score in Karl Klindworth’s piano reduction 
(Mainz, 1913) available through the IMSLP/Petrucci online library 
<http://www.imslp.org/wiki/>. Measure numbers refer to the full score edited by John 
Deathridge and Klaus Döge (Mainz, 1996, 1998, 2000).   25
both die. Their mental kinship is reflected in their tonal space, A-flat major for Elsa and flat 
keys for Friedrich in Act I. 
Choice of key also underscores the conjugal state of the two couples. Elsa’s A-flat 
major is the nearest possible to Lohengrin’s A major yet the furthest away in the circle of 
fifths, the half-tone friction between the two tonal plateaus suggesting the impossibility of a 
human-divine union.
27 In their first encounter, Lohengrin briefly adopts Elsa’s key up to the 
repeated Frageverbot, which brings him back to A. [Ex. 3] Wagner wonderfully frames this 
episode with two chorus sections in A major, reflecting Lohengrin’s divine aura. In Act III, 
their brief spell of conjugal happiness finds expression in E major (mm. 306ff), but following 
their duet’s climax in unison singing (mm. 355-361), the music reverts to Lohengrin’s key 
(m. 363). He will return to flat key area only prior to his departure, addressing Elsa for the 
last time (mm. 1298-1368). On the side of the villains, Friedrich’s vocal space of flat keys in 
Act I is reversed in the following one, a clear sign of his dependence on Ortrud. His full 
conversion to her key of F-sharp minor comes with their homophonic singing in the revenge 
duet (mm. 391-418). 
Wagner not only invented Ortrud but also endowed her with his most advanced 
techniques.
28 While Lohengrin’s mindset of absolute belief is evident through triadic, folk-
like melodies [Ex. 4], Ortrud’s cognitive complexity manifests itself in harmonically open 
utterances, with emphasis on diminished seventh chords, the use of the orchestra as an index 
of her seductive power, and specific motifs ‘whose presence evokes a nexus of slithery, 
                                                 
27 For a study of the opera’s literary models on this topic, see Dieter Borchmeyer, Drama and 
the World of Richard Wagner, trans. Daphne Ellis (Princeton and Oxford, 2003), 147-56. 
28 Hunt, ‘Ortrud and the Birth of a New Style’, 47-70.   26
sinister, readily shifting figures.’
29 Most prominent of these is that of temptation 
(‘Versuchungs-motiv’) formed around a diminished seventh chord. Its appearance in the last 
two acts of the opera affirms Ortrud’s successful penetration into the minds of her victims. In 
Act II scene 1, we hear it underscoring Friedrich’s admission ‘wie willst du doch 
geheimnisvoll den Geist mir neu berücken!’ [would you once again mislead my spirit by your 
arcane arts?] (mm. 260-261); moments later, he is under Ortrud’s full control singing the 
revenge oath with her in the octave. More prominently, the motif signals the cognitive 
assaults against Elsa’s absolute belief in Lohengrin. Her mental poisoning begins with 
Ortrud’s warning ‘zu blind nicht deinem Glück zu trauen’ [not to trust too blindly in your 
happiness] (m. 761). As argued above, doubt begins its workings (in reduced form of the 
motif in Elsa’s signature instrument oboe) after her public confrontation with Ortrud, forcing 
her plead to Lohengrin ‘Mein Reiter! Schütze mich vor dieser Frau!’ [My rescuer! Protect me 
from this woman!] (mm. 1651-1656) and reaches its climax in Friedrich’s final address to 
Elsa ‘Vertraue mir!’ (mm. 2001-2013). The motif reappears in her Act III scene with 
Lohengrin, occupying Elsa’s mind in m. 634 and finally overtaking her vocal line in mm. 
654-658 (‘Wie soll ich Ärmste glauben, dir g’nüge meine Treu?’ [How can I believe that my 
poor trust is sufficient?]). [Ex. 5] Aside from motivic treatment, the intense chromaticism 
associated with Ortrud allows her to manipulate harmonically her victims. Consider, for 
example, Friedrich’s final glimpse of suspicion in F minor (mm. 364-372), which Ortrud 
instantly dissolves by enharmonic modulation into C-sharp major for a return to her native F-
sharp minor key (mm. 374-376). [Ex. 6] 
If Elsa’s changing beliefs are evident through the temptation motif, Friedrich’s 
confusion is suggested through harmonic and rhythmic means. His mental struggle, after 
                                                 
29 Thomas S. Grey, ‘Leitmotif, temporality, and musical design in the Ring’, in Grey, 
Cambridge Companion to Wagner, 88.   27
being advised to withdraw from the duel, manifests as irregular palpitation of clusters of 
seconds moving gradually upwards. [Ex. 7] Relevant to our cognitive perspective are also 
two musical parallels. The ascending chromatic line in the flute in Act I prepares us for Elsa’s 
vision of her savior sung in her native A-flat major. Wagner describes her demeanor as 
confident (‘Elsas Mienen gehen von dem Ausdruck träumerischen Entrücktseins zu dem 
schwärmerischer Verklärung über.’ mm. 350-54), signaling a state of absolute belief, which 
Ortrud and Friedrich will later attack. The same gesture is repeated only once in the opera, in 
Act III, at the conclusion of Elsa’s love duet with Lohengrin. This time the ascending line 
leads to A major, Lohengrin’s key. The two instances frame Elsa’s period of absolute belief, 
one where she has the resources to fight doubt. Indeed, after the second gesture the 
deterioration of her mindset is rapid and irreversible. [Ex. 8] Another musical parallelism 
with cognitive effects is the call ‘Elsa’. It cannot be a coincidence that Ortrud’s first call to 
her is on the notes of the Frageverbot with practically identical accompaniment. As if 
intuiting the fatal consequences of her befriending Ortrud, Elsa responds ‘Wie schauerlich 
und klagend ertönt mein Name durch die Nacht!’ [How sinister and mournful is the sound of 
my name in the night!] When Lohengrin calls her by name in Act III, he inadvertently evokes 
the moment, as the sudden harmonic change from sharp to flat key and Elsa’s reply show 
‘Wie süss mein Name deinem Mund entgleitet!’ [How sweetly my name glides from your 
lips!] But since her encounter with Ortrud led her to doubt, she now continues ‘Gönnst du des 
deinem holden Klang mir nicht?’ [Must you refuse to let your own be heard?] In other words, 
Ortrud ingeniously appropriates the Frageverbot to induce Elsa to breach it. [Ex. 9] 
 
Concluding remarks 
This essay proposes a critical reengagement with Wagner’s most neglected opera in postwar 
years. Introducing social science and game theoretic methodologies in opera hermeneutics,   28
we subject Lohengrin’s main characters to a rigorous epistemological analysis, studying their 
beliefs and decision-making strategies. In particular, we employ novel methodological tools 
in opera criticism to trace the cognitive state of the opera’s two dramatic variables, Elsa and 
Friedrich, as they move from one reversal of fortune to another. Their fluctuating behavior 
involve complex higher-order or self-reflective beliefs and are a key to a deeper 
understanding of Elsa’s choice, which stands at the core of the opera. 
Elsa asks the forbidden question because she needs certainty about Lohengrin’s belief 
in her innocence. Only by finding out his true ‘Nam und Art’, his true reason for fighting for 
her will be revealed. She may fear that asking the forbidden question may have terrible 
consequences, but not asking it will leave her in permanent agony, as she will live with 
someone whom she suspects of suspecting her of murder. This is the most unsettling result of 
this epistemological study, as it offers a radically different, psychologically convincing 
answer to the central question that drives two thirds of the Lohengrin plot. At the same time it 
offers a much more modern view of Elsa who not simply passively accepts the verdicts of 
others about her guilt or innocence but instead makes an active choice to prove her 
innocence. The analysis also upgrades the dramatic role of the combat scene in Act I, the 
outcome of which becomes a fixed point of reference for the rest of the opera. 
We find that this approach yields substantial benefits for multiple recipients. Students 
and critics can probe with precision the dramatic coherence of operas and the psychological 
depth of their characters. Opera singers and directors can analyze character motivation with 
reliable accuracy and deepen their engagement with the performed material. Not least, 
spectators and listeners can use a powerful tool to explore the internal world of the operatic 
canon and better appreciate dramatic nuances. Above all, this perspective reflects Wagner’s 
own vision for an all-embracing music drama. Much as the artist has to ‘completely step 
outside himself, to grasp the inner nature of an alien personality with that completeness   29
                                                
which is needful before he can portray it,’
30 so a spectator can better identify with Wagnerian 
heroes if he engages with their state of mind. Indeed, Wagner’s understanding and use of the 
orchestra as a universal current out of which emerge individual utterances and upon which 
float ideas as leitmotifs practically invites for a cognitive opera criticism whether this appears 
as Wolzogen’s leitmotif guide or a rigorous analysis like the one undertaken here. 
 
30 Richard Wagner, ‘The Art-Work of the Future’, trans. William Ashton Ellis, in Richard 
Wagner’s Prose Works Volume 1 (London, 1895), 193. Example 1Example 1Example 2Example 2Example 3Example 3Example 3Example 4Example 4Example 5Example 5Example 5Example 5Example 5Example 5Example 5Example 5Example 6Example 7Example 7Example 8Example 8Example 8Example 8Example 9Example 9Example 9Example 9